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Cross-border  trade  remains  a  contentious  issue  in  the  restructuring  of  the  European  electricity  market. 
Difficulties  stem  from  the  lack  of  a  common  market  design,  the  separation  between  energy  and 
transmission markets and the insufficient coordination between Transmission System Operators (TSOs). 
This paper analyzes the cross-border trade problem through a set of models that represent different degrees 
of coordination both between the energy and transmission markets and among national TSOs. 
We first present the optimal organisation, not implemented in Europe, where energy and transmission are 
integrated according to the nodal price paradigm and Power Exchanges (PXs) and TSOs are integrated. 
This is our reference case. We then move to a more realistic representation of the European electricity 
market  based  on  the  so-called  market-coupling  design  where  energy  and  transmission  are  operated 
separately by PXs and TSOs. When considering different degrees of coordination of the national TSOs’ 
activities, we unexpectedly find that some arrangements are more efficient than the lack of coordination 
might suggest. Specifically we find that even without a formal coordination of the TSOs’ counter-trading 
operations, non discriminatory access to common counter-trading resources for all TSOs may lead to a 
partial implicit coordination of these TSOs. In other words, an internal market of counter-trading resources 
partially substitutes the lack of integration of the TSOs. While a full access to counter-trading resources is a 
weaker requirement than the horizontal integration of the TSO, it is still quite demanding. We show that 
quantitative limitations to the access of these resources decrease the efficiency of counter-trading. The 
paper supposes price taking agents and hence leaves aside the incentive to game the system induced by 
zonal systems. 
Keywords:  Cross-Border  Energy  Trade,  Market-Coupling,  Counter-Trading,  Coordination,  Generalized 
Nash Equilibrium. 
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Experience indicates that the restructuring of the electricity sector towards compe-
tition is more complicated than foreseen. Specically while the application of rst
economic principles on Kirchho's laws tells us that electricity should be dierentiated
by location and hence that the energy and transmission markets should be integrated,
the argument that this makes the market unnecessarily complicated has been widely
advocated. The pressure for market organizations based on a coarse geographic dier-
entiation of the product has thus been considerable. Similarly the lack of storability
of electricity suggests the need for a very strong coordination among all agents in-
volved in the market. Here again the argument has been that this departs too much
from normal market operations, leading to a considerable pressure to retain as much
decentralization in the market as possible. This joint pressure for a loose geographic
dierentiation of electricity prices and a rather decentralized organisation of the en-
ergy and transmission markets has been encountered throughout the world. It is also
present in Europe where the problem is made more acute by the legal requirement to
construct a single electricity market.
These diculties have been particularly striking in the organisation of cross-border
trade among Member States that stakeholders have now been discussing since more
than 10 years. This paper attempts to model dierent market organisations inspired
by these discussions and the possibilities oered by the third legislative package (see
[6]) to introduce multinational Transmission System Operators (TSO) to deal with
congestion issues.
It has now been abundantly argued both on the basis of theory and successful
restructuring experiences that electricity markets should rely on an organization where
transmission and energy clear simultaneously at spatial level. This system is now
implemented in the restructured part of the US electricity market. The model accounts
for the physical properties of the electricity commodity and the characteristics of the
grid. We refer to this situation as Model 1 and take it as our benchmark. From
an economic point of view, Model 1 represents a complete market where all spatial
arbitrage opportunities allowed by the physical constraints of the grid are traded away.
While this type of market exists and is operated successfully in dierent regions
of the world, it is not accepted in Europe. The most sophisticated organisation of
cross border trade in the continental European electricity market is known as Market-
3Coupling (MC) (see Belpex web site). It is currently operated between Belgium, France
and The Netherlands and should soon be extended to the Western border of Germany.
This organisation can be described as follows. TSOs provide the national PXs with
a simplied representation of the network that is meant to represent its transmission
possibilities. The PXs then clear national and international energy markets within the
simplied representation of the grid. Because the resulting power trades are not nec-
essarily feasible for the real network, TSOs undertake \counter-trading operations" in
order to re-balance the ows and make them compatible with physical grid constraints.
We refer to this problem as Model 2 when all TSOs act in a fully integrated way to
manage network congestion. By using a simplied description of the grid, Model 2
misrepresents spatial arbitrage possibilities and organizes an incomplete market.
The current organisation of market-coupling is dierent and may still evolve. The
situation today is that each TSO manages congestion on its national grid with multi-
lateral arrangements controlling congestion on the interconnections. Because of loop
ows, the actions of each TSO or group of TSOs have an impact on the network of
the other TSOs. We refer to this situation as Model 3 of which we consider dierent
views. These view are inspired by the third legislative package that allows for multi-
national TSOs, that is TSOs that cover several countries. Model 3 further degrades
the situation compared to Model 2 by organizing an incomplete transmission market.
All real world markets have some degree of ineciencies and it is not certain ex ante
that those embedded in Models 2 and 3 are serious, at least if one neglects the incen-
tive to game counter-trading operations as we do here. It all depends on the particular
situation on hand, that is, on the capacities of the grid and the structure of generation
and demand. These things can only be appreciated by numerical testing. We introduce
these models on a stylized example (see [1] for the mathematical details) and apply
them on a small prototype model of the pentalateral market where market-coupling is
currently developed (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and The Netherlands).
Surprisingly we nd that the lack of formal coordination of the counter-trading op-
erations embedded in Model 3 can be partially substituted by a competitive access
to counter-trading resources. In other words an internal market of counter-trading
resources can in principle restore some of the eciency that the lack of integration of
the TSOs normally entails. While this is a weaker requirement than a full integration
of the TSOs, it is still demanding. We show that quantitative limitations to the access
4of these resources eectively decreases the eciency of counter-trading.
The problem treated here arises from the need to spatially dierentiate electricity
in a grid constrained market. The so-called RTO or ISO organisation that now prevails
in several regions of the US recognizes the need for a tight integration of the energy
and transmission operations. This model (that we stylize in Model 1) is now well
understood; it is briey recalled in Section 2 together with Chao and Peck (1998, see
[2]) six node example that serves to support the conceptual discussion in Sections 3
and 4. Europe is pursuing a dierent approach1. \Market-coupling" (MC) is today the
most advanced European arrangement of cross-border trade. It supposes that national
PXs clear the multi-area energy market on the basis of a simplied ATC (available
transmission capacity) description of the grid and leaves it to the TSOs to tackle the
resulting congestions. We describe the energy market clearing part of MC in Section
3. While an integrated European TSO would be in the best position to tackle the
congestions resulting from the clearing of the energy market Europeans are still hesitant
as to the degree of integration of transmission that they want to implement. Section 4
examines dierent possibilities for organizing counter-trading operations and discusses
the unintended but positive impact that some of these methods can have. Section
5 introduces a stylized case study that is then elaborated in Section 6. Conclusion
terminates the paper.
2 The six node example and Model 1: the inte-
grated energy and transmission markets
We introduce the dierent models on Chao and Peck's six node example (see [2]) de-
picted in Figure 1. The network is composed of eight lines of which (1-6) and (2-5) have
limited transfer capacity. Generators operate in nodes 1, 2 and 4 and consumers are
located in nodes 3, 5 and 6. The network is represented by the standard Power Transfer
Distribution (PTDF) matrix. The authors assume a \owgate model" as is currently
foreseen (but not implemented) in Europe. We therefore conduct the discussion in
those terms even when assuming fully integrated electricity and transmission markets.
1For more information, see the electricity section in the \Florence Forum" on DG Energy at:
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas electricity/forum electricity orence en.htm
5The owgate model can be interpreted as zonal or nodal depending on whether the
owgates link nodes or zones. The European view is that it should be zonal; we suppose
price taking agents and hence assume away any incentive to game the system induced
by the zonal system. Perfect integration supposes that PXs and TSOs are merged
into a single entity (the ISO) that behaves as if solving a welfare optimization problem
constructed on the basis of supply and demand bids. This model is well known and
not elaborated on here. It is our Model 1.
Figure 1: Six node market
3 Market-coupling (MC) and the clearing of the
energy market
The restructuring of electricity in Europe has seen considerable resistance against the
full dierentiation of electricity by location. The MC organisation adopted in Central
Western Europe is an intermediate arrangement. In this approach, the energy market
spatially clears on a zonal basis constructed on a simplied representation of the grid.
It is the role of the TSOs to (i) provide the energy market with this simplied repre-
sentation of the grid and to (ii) remedy any line overow that appears after clearing
the energy market. Models 2 and 3 are based on the same MC representation of the
energy market, but dier by how TSOs tackle congestion.
An example of a two zones market is depicted in Figure 2 for the six node example.
There exists two PXs, one for each zone; the imports/exports from one zone to the
6other are capped by some transfer limit which here represents the grid. This limit is
an Available Transmission Capacity (ATC). The computation of the ATC and more
generally the construction of the simplied representation of the grid by the TSOs go
beyond the scope of this paper. The zonal PX clears the domestic market for given
imports and exports. The dierent zonal PXs also simultaneously clear the cross-
border energy market by playing on imports and exports in a way that accounts for
the ATC between the zones. All in all, we can assume that the two zonal PXs operate
in a coordinate way, as if they were just one PX, and their actions can be modelled as
resulting from a welfare maximization conducted on all geographic zones and subject
to the sole ATC constraints.
Figure 2: Zonal representation of the six node market
4 Counter-trading services
The clearing of the energy market operated by the PXs is a welfare maximization
problem that nds a market equilibrium between the quantities of electricity oered and
demanded in the whole six node market, taking into account the ATC representation
of the network. This determines the electricity prices in the Northern and Southern
zones. The price is unique in the two zones if the ATC is not congested. There are
dierent prices otherwise. Because the energy market clears on an ATC model that
may only be a very imperfect representation of the real grid, the resulting ows may
exceed the capacities of the physical lines. Counter-trading is an operation whereby
TSOs trade incremental of decremental injections at the dierent nodes in order to
7remove the overows that result from clearing the energy market on the sole ATC
model.
Counter-trading can be organized in dierent ways: one possibility is for TSOs to
jointly remove overows at minimal cost. Another possibility is to have TSO \coop-
erate" in a more or less formalized way. Counter-trading has a cost which must be
charged to the agents of the energy market. We compute this cost but do no examine
here its impact on energy trade. We use the six node example to illustrate dierent
degrees of coordination. In contrast with full coordination which is an unambiguous
notion, there are many ways to think of imperfect coordination. The discussion that
follows is thus by nature illustrative. Our nal goal however is to characterize the lack
of coordination in a quantitative way.
Let qi be the vector of injections and withdrawals of the market equilibrium of the
PX's welfare maximization problem obtained on the ATC network depicted in Figure
2. Assume, for the sake of the discussion, that the ows resulting from these qi violate
the capacity of lines (1-6) and (2-5) of the real network in Figure 1. TSOs can act
on line ows by purchasing incremental or decremental generation or consumption of
electricity qi. This means that quantities produced (or consumed) can be shifted
from one producer (or consumer) to another. These adaptations must be limited
though. First, they should be feasible (not exceed plant capacity or lead to negative
consumption or generation). Second, changes of generation should net out to zero for
each TSO; similarly changes of consumption should net out to zero for each TSO. We
introduce more or less coordinated ways of conducting this task.
Let TSON and TSOS be the two TSOs in charge of the Northern and the Southern
zones respectively. A rst assumption discussed in Section 4.1 is to suppose that TSON
and TSOS jointly solve a unique optimization problem to minimize the total cost of
removing the overows resulting from the qi. The alternative is to suppose that TSON
and TSOS separately act to remove line overows taking into account the actions of
the other. This leads to a Nash equilibrium problem. Sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2 and 4.2.3
present alternative formulations of this scenario. The mathematical problems and their
economic interpretations are discussed in detail in a companion paper (see [1]).
84.1 Model 2: Integrated counter-trading
Integrated counter-trading is achieved when the TSOs of both zones operate jointly
to remove line overows at minimal cost. Note that TSON and TSOS take as given
the quantities qi that result from the clearing of the energy market by MC. The model
is an optimization problem (see the companion paper [1]): each TSO is in charge of
buying and selling counter-trading services in its own area2 at minimal cost, but the
optimization is joint. It gives a single price for each counter-trading resource as well
as for each congested line.
4.2 Model 3: Coordinated and uncoordinated counter-
trading
As indicated above one can conceive of dierent imperfectly coordinated counter-
trading in dierent ways. We discuss the economic eects of dierent approaches
in this section.
4.2.1 Implicitly coordinated counter-trading: version 1 of Model 3
We rst assume that each TSO acts independently to manage congestion on the in-
terconnections, taking the actions of the other TSO as given. We further assume that
each TSO can buy counter-trading services in both zones. This means that, dierently
from the case described in Section 4.1, both TSOs can trade at each node. We note the
actions undertaken by the TSOs as qN
i=1;:::;6 and qS
i=1;:::;6. The network remains the
common good shared by the TSOs but the absence of coordination may induce them to
assign dierent values to the congested lines. The plurality of values is the source of a
market incompleteness that can degrade the transmission market. In economic terms,
this problem is a Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE). This problem generally has
several solutions leading to dierent values implicitly assigned to the interconnections
(see [1]).
The surprising eect of the situation is that, even in absence of full coordination,
we nd that the two TSOs have no choice but assigning the same value to the common
transmission constraints. This has an economic interpretation. The model assumes
2Respectively qN
i=1;2;3 for the Northern TSON and qS
i=4;5;6 for the Southern TSOS.
9that both TSOs trade the same counter-trading resources without limitation. They
thus pay the same price for those resources. The price of counter-trading resources de-
termines the value attributed to the congested lines. Identical counter-trading resource
prices therefore imply identical valuations of the congested lines. Everything happens
as if counter-trading were operated in an integrated way. The mathematical implica-
tion is that the solution of the GNE is the solution of the associated Nash Equilibrium,
which diers from the GNE by assuming a market for the congested owgates. The
policy implication is that it does not hurt to keep separate TSOs if there is free access
to global counter-trading resources. As we shall see this free access is required for the
results to hold.
4.2.2 Uncoordinated counter-trading: version 2 of Model 3
The above model assumes that both TSOs can resort to all counter-trading resources
on an equal basis. TSON has no priority on Northern resources compared to TSOS.
This sets a single price of counter-trading for the two TSOs and hence indirectly insures
the coordination of their activities. It is unlikely in practice that all TSOs would have
equal access to all counter-trading resources. We therefore consider an alternative
case where we suppose that TSON has limited access to the Southern resources and
conversely. More specically, we assume that TSOs only have limited access to counter-
trading resources in other control areas and specify a bound on this access. A TSO
that hits its quota in another jurisdiction therefore faces a scarcity rent that cannot
be arbitraged away with the other TSO. Because counter-trading resources are now
priced dierently, the value assigned by the TSOs to the congested lines also dier and
the perfect coordination is lost. This makes counter-trading inecient.
4.2.3 Uncoordinated counter-trading: version 3 of Model 3
The limit case is the one where a TSO can only access the counter-trading resources
of its own area and acts taking the actions of the other as given. This creates line
valuation dierences that cannot be arbitraged away. This destroys all possibilities of
coordination and increases ineciencies in counter-trading.
105 A case Sstudy
We now consider a pilot case study constructed on the basis of the network of the
Central Western European (CWE) power market depicted in Figure 3. This network
is composed of fteen nodes connected by 28 lines with limited capacity distributed
over four countries: Germany, France, Belgium and The Netherlands. Generators,
consumers and dierent TSOs operate in the two Belgian (Merchtem and Gramme)
and the three Dutch (Krimpen, Maastricht and Zwolle) nodes as well as in the two big
French and German nodes. The other French and German nodes are inter-connectors
used to transfer power only. As with the representation adopted in the six node exam-
ple, the grid is modeled by using a PTDF matrix provided by ECN ([3]).
Figure 3: CWE power market
Adopting a standard technological representation of the power sector, we assume
that eight electricity companies3 plus a fringe of small competitors operate in this
market and produce electricity running a set of eight dierent technologies4 following
an endogenously determined merit order.
We consider a time horizon of one year measured in hours per year, subdivided in
two periods with dierent durations (respectively 5,136 h and 3,624 h) and dierent
3E.ON Energie AG, Electrabel SA, Electricit e de France, ENBW Energieversorgung Baden-W urttemberg,
Essent Energie Productie BV, Nuon, RWE Energie AG, Vattenfall Europe AG.
4Specically, hydro, renewables, nuclear, lignite, coal, CCGT, natural gas and oil base plants.
11base load demand. Our focus is however not on the distinction between peak and base
demand but on the geographical dierentiation of electricity demand and generation.
A wholesale reference price of 40 e/MWh is applied as well as an elasticity of -
0.1 in the reference point. Our simulations are calibrated with data updated to 2005.
Demand data are provided by Eurostat while generation capacities come from the
public reports of the power companies included in the model.
A PX and a TSO operate in each of the four modeled countries. They are inte-
grated into a single pool in the reference \nodal model". Following European practice,
they remain separated entities in the other cases. In line with the design of \market-
coupling" we assume that an equilibrium mechanism links all PXs so that they behave
in an integrated way as if there were a unique PX operating on a simplied network.
On the contrary, TSOs can organize their activities in dierent ways as we explain in
the following.
6 Modelling and results
We construct several models that correspond to dierent multinational TSO arrange-
ments made possible by the third legislative package. These introduce various degrees
of geographic coordination of counter-trading, which may in turn have dierent im-
pacts on electricity trading. The models and the results are presented along the same
philosophy as in the six node example: we proceed from full to no coordination. Model
1 describes the full integration of energy and transmission; it represents the perfect
coordination where energy is fully dierentiated by location (within the limits of our
data). This arrangement is a \rst best". The other models are of the MC type with
a imperfect integration of energy and transmission in the sense that the energy market
rst clears on a simplied representation of the grid operated by the PXs and TSOs
take care of possible line overows in a second stage. Taking stock of the results of
the MC problem, Model 2 supposes a fully coordinated counter-trading with a single
TSO covering Belgium, France, Germany and The Netherlands. This implementation
of market-coupling is a \second best". It represents the most ecient implementation
of the third package. Model 3 eectively consists of a set of models of alternative TSO
arrangements.
All TSO operations are conducted on the owgate description of the grid given in
12Figure 4: Stylized CWE market
Figure 3. This representation is taken from [4]. In contrast the PXs operate on an
ATC representation of the grid depicted in Figure 4. This representation supposes
that the network is subdivided into four zones connected by ATCs. Market-coupling
is currently conducted on an ATC model but a move to a \ow based" model (which
is eectively a owgate model) is foreseen for 2010. No information is available on
the current organisation of counter-trading, the ocial philosophy being that a proper
denition of the ATC suces to solve grid problems. We now present these dierent
models in more detail.
6.1 Model 1: The full integration of energy and transmis-
sion
All PXs and TSOs are integrated in a single entity. This is the standard \nodal system"
(which is here eectively a zonal system because of data limitation). It avoids what
Hogan calls \the fallacy of separation" and corresponds to Joskow's \textbook" model
(see [5]). There is a single physical model of the grid, which is the one depicted in
Figure 3.
The solution of this model highlights that congestion only occurs on the intercon-
nections between Belgium and The Netherlands on one side and Belgium and France
on the other side. The social welfare is 267,124,462,455 e. By construction, the ows
resulting from the joint clearing of the energy and transmission markets are feasible
13for the grid.
6.1.1 Sensitivity analysis
We also conduct a simple sensitivity analysis on Model 1 by modifying the values of the
reference demands used to calibrate the demand functions. We nd that increases of
the reference electricity demands by 5, 10 and 20% respectively lead to social welfares
of 279,254,121,514 e, 291,080,340,843 e and 313,591,708,405 e.
6.2 The energy market in the \market-coupling" of Mod-
els 2 and 3
Models 2 and 3 separate the PXs and the TSOs. This falls into the \fallacy of sepa-
ration" and departs from the successful \textbook" approach (see [5]). Following the
principle of market-coupling we assume a dierent PX in each of the four markets but
suppose that market clearing takes place on a geographic basis described by the ATC
network of Figure 4.
The clearing of the sole energy market in Models 2 and 3 (that is the outcome of the
coordinated activities of the PXs) leads to overows on fourteen lines. These comprise
both interconnections (Germany-Netherlands, Netherlands-Belgium, Belgium-France,
France-Germany) and domestic (German, Dutch and Belgian) lines. The social welfare
resulting from the sole clearing of the energy market, that is before removing violations
of line constraints, amounts to 267,570,731,848 e. There is a welfare increase of 0,17%.
This amounts to 446 million e/year. This increase is articial though, as it is only
permitted by violating line constraints.
6.3 Model 2: Market-coupling with integrated counter-
trading
Because the clearing of the energy market in all cases but Model 1 relies on the simpli-
ed representation of the grid (Figure 4) its outcome is not necessarily feasible for the
grid. A second step is thus required whereby TSOs engage in counter-trading in order
to remove congestion, both national and on the inter-connectors. The third package
allows for the inception of multinational TSOs, but does not impose them. Follow-
14ing the discussion of the six node example we introduce dierent organisations that
also involve multinational TSOs. A rst case supposes a single TSO covering the four
countries and operating on the grid depicted in Figure 3. This constitutes Model 2.
The coordinated action of TSOs in Model 2 removes the line overows occurring
from the clearing of the energy market. The interesting result is that congested lines
and marginal values of those lines are identical to those of Model 1. Counter-trading
operations imply re-dispatching costs that decrease the social welfare by 4 Million
e/year (-0.0015%) compared to Model 1. This is reported in Table 1. This loss of
welfare is the price to pay for the separation of the energy and transmission markets.
This price is here small: averaging the cost of counter-trading on the whole load of the
region leads to a value of 0.374 e/MWh.
Social Welfare (e) Re-dispatching costs (e/MWh)
Model 1 267,124,462,455
Model 2 267,120,396,787 0.374
Table 1: Welfare and average re-dispatching costs (Models 1 and 2)
6.3.1 Sensitivity analysis
Table 2 extends the sensitivity analysis to Model 2. As we did in Model 1, we consider
increases of the reference electricity demand of 5, 10 and 20%.
Demand level Total Average Welfare (PX)
for (B-NL) TSO Re-dispatching costs Re-dispatching costs
Reference 450,335,061 0.374 267,120,396,787
Increase 5% 431,283,689 0.346 279,249,137,781
Increase 10% 549,816,403 0.426 291,066,310,376
Increase 20% 321,992,912 0.240 313,589,922,952
Table 2: Welfare, total and average re-dispatching costs (Model 2)
The average re-dispatching costs now amounts to 0.346, 0.426 and 0.240 e/MWh for
5, 10 and 20% increases of the energy demand respectively. Welfare losses with regard
to the corresponding scenarios of the sensitivity analysis of Model 1 are respectively
154.9, 14 and 1.7 Million e/year. Neither average re-dispatching cost or welfare loss is
monotone with load because congestion is not monotone with load.
6.4 Model 3: Market-coupling with imperfect coordina-
tion of TSOs
The history of European cross border trade reveals that stakeholders prefer bilateral
arrangements to integrated solutions. The results of Model 2 showed that the only
congestions remaining after integrated counter-trading operations are those of the in-
terconnections between France and Belgium and Belgium and The Netherlands. This
suggests a less integrated approach where congestion problems are handled in the re-
gions where they occur. Model 3 considers a set of these approaches as we describe
now.
6.4.1 Model 3.1 : A trilateral TSO (F-B-NL)
The sole congestion on interconnections between France and Belgium and Belgium
and The Netherlands suggests an organisation whereby a single TSO covering the
Belgian, French and Dutch markets manages congestion by counter-trading in these
three countries (this is the current trilateral market (see Belpex web site)), leaving
German injections and withdrawals identical to those determined in the clearing of the
energy market. We depict this situation on Figure 5.
Figure 5: A trilateral TSO (F-B-NL)
Since there is a multinational TSO in charge of removing congestion occurring in
the Belgian, French and Dutch market and there is no action by the German TSO,
16the problem boils down to a single optimization problem where the trilateral TSOs
(F-B-NL) eliminates congestion at minimal welfare loss.
We nd that the re-dispatching cost slightly increases compared to the one observed
in Model 2. Welfare amounts to 267,116,142,245 e which corresponds to losses of 4.2
(0.002%) and 8.3 million e/year (0.003%) with respect to the values obtained in Models
2 and 1 respectively (compare to Table 1). Welfare losses increase compared to Model
2 because the German TSO no longer contributes to counter-trading. This may look
surprising as there is no residual congestion on the lines with Germany in the outcome
of Model 2 and a pure ATC reasoning would suggest that there is thus no reason
to involve the German TSO. However Kirchho's laws justify involving this TSO in
order to reduce the overall cost of congestion. This illustrates the fallacy of the idea
of removing congestion at the local level. Averaging the re-dispatching cost over the
load of the trilateral market gives 0.693 e/MWh. Averaging this re-dispatching cost
over the whole load gives 0.377903 e/MWh (approximately 0.378 e/MWh). Needless
to say the German TSO is likely to object to charging operators in its control area in
order to contribute to congestion relief in the trilateral market.
6.4.2 Model 3.2 : A hybrid system: one trilateral TSO (F-B-NL) and
two bilateral TSOs (G-NL) and (G-F)
It is known (and conrmed by sensitivity analysis) that congestion can occur on the
Germany-Netherlands and France-Germany interconnections. Generalizing the decen-
tralized view of counter-trading, one introduces an organisation whereby three multi-
lateral TSOs intervene to manage congestion. Specically, we keep the (F-B-NL) TSO
for handling congestion in the trilateral market but also introduce two bilateral TSOs
(G-NL) and (G-F) to manage congestion on the Dutch-German and French-German
interconnections respectively. This new arrangement, aimed at increasing coordination
among TSOs, is depicted on Figure 6.
Invoking the discussion of Section 4.2.1, one observes that this arrangement cre-
ates arbitrage possibilities on Dutch and French counter-trading resources respectively;
these are traded away if (F-B-NL) and (G-NL) pay the same price for Dutch counter-
trading resources and (F-B-NL) and (G-F) similarly pay the same price for French
resources. We thus end up in a situation where even though (F-B-NL), (B-NL) and
(G-NL) behave in principle in an uncoordinated way, their paying identical prices for
17Figure 6: The trilateral TSO (F-B-NL) and two bilateral TSOs (G-NL) and (G-F)
counter-trading resources on some markets implicitly forces some coordination between
them. Our simulations conrm this reasoning: we obtain the results of the explicit
TSOs' coordination of Model 2.
We mentioned in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 that this problem is a Generalized Nash
Equilibrium and hence generally has many solutions (depending on the bargaining
power of the dierent agents). It is remarkable that our attempts to nd alternative
solutions by giving more or less weight to some TSOs failed: the sole fact of the dierent
TSOs paying the same price for common counter-trading resources forces the implicit
coordination that leads to the same outcome as the explicit coordination of Model 2.
This desired result does not come for free. It requires that TSOs have non-
discriminatory access to common re-dispatching resources (Dutch resources for (F-B-
NL) and (G-NL) and French resources for (F-B-NL) and (F-G)). As explained above,
even though there is no explicit trading of interconnection capacities at the counter-
trading level in Model 3.2 (in contrast with Model 2), the fact that TSOs or groups
of TSOs resort to identical counter-trading resources for which they pay the same
price implies that they eectively see the same value for interconnections capacities.
The set of solutions of the Generalized Nash equilibrium reduces to the single solution
of the associated Nash Equilibrium problem where interconnections capacities are ef-
fectively traded among TSOs. This is the result achieved by perfect coordination of
the counter-trading operations in Model 2. The next model delves somewhat deeper
into what happens when one relaxes the assumption of non discriminatory access to
counter-trading resources.
186.4.3 Model 3.3 : A mental experiment: two bilateral TSOs (F-B)
and (B-NL) in the trilateral market
We delve into the implicit coordination mechanism underlying Model 3.2 by considering
a simplied situation where the trilateral TSO (B-F-NL) is split into two bilateral TSOs
(F-B) and (B-NL) that separately take care of the congestion in the sole trilateral
market. The case focuses on the implicit coordination that automatically occurs as a
result of non discriminatory and unlimited access to the resources common to these
two bilateral TSOs (here Belgian resources). This arrangement is depicted in Figure
7.
Figure 7: Two bilateral TSOs (F-B) and (B-NL) in the trilateral market
The economic interpretation of this model is that there is a common market for
the use of Belgian counter-trading resources by the (F-B) and (B-NL) TSOs, which
thus value them at the same price. In contrast there is no common market of inter-
connection capacities, which TSOs can therefore value dierently. Again, this model
is a Generalized Nash Equilibrium of the type considered in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2.
We want to explore the extent to which access to common counter-trading resources
forces coordination among TSOs.
Suppose rst that (F-B) and (B-NL) have full and non-discriminatory access to
Belgian TSO resources. Numerical simulation shows that we fall back on the solution
obtained in Section 6.4.1. Even though we do not explicitly impose coordination of
(F-B) and (B-NL) operations, arbitrage on Belgian counter-trading resources implic-
itly forces this coordination. This result holds true whatever the respective weights
given to the two TSOs in the solution of the Generalized Nash Equilibrium. The only
solution of the Generalized Nash Equilibrium is the solution of the associated Nash
19Equilibrium, in this case also the solution of the optimization problem of 6.4.1, that
trades interconnections capacities.
Variation limits Total Average Welfare (PX)
for (B-NL) TSO Re-dispatching costs Re-dispatching costs
936 454,591,481 0.377904 267,116,140,367
936*0.5 454,591,481 0.377904 267,116,140,367
936*0.1 460,145,326 0.382521 267,110,586,522
Table 3: Welfare, total and average re-dispatching costs of the scenarios where (B-NL) has
limited action in Belgium
Suppose next that the access to Belgian counter-trading resources by one of these
bilateral TSOs is limited. This asymmetric arrangement is meant to represent one
of these heterogeneous organisations that so often prevail in the EU. We now test
whether the restriction of arbitrage possibilities limits the implicit coordination. The
following reports a sample of the such results. Suppose that (F-B) has full access
to the Belgian counter-trading resources, while access to these resources is restricted
for (B-NL). Results are reported in Table 3 that is interpreted as follows. The value
\936" in the rst column corresponds to the largest capacity of the congested lines
between Belgium and The Netherlands. It is taken as an upper bound on the amount
of counter-trading resources necessary to relieve congestion between Belgium and The
Netherlands. The coecient that multiplies this value expresses the fraction of this
amount of counter-trading resources available to (B-NL). The other columns are self
explanatory. The average counter-trading cost is computed by dividing the counter-
trading cost by the load of the trilateral market.
Similar outcomes are reported in Table 4 where we consider a symmetric scenario
where the (F-B) TSO has limited access to the re-dispatching resources in Belgium.
In this case, the value \898" in the rst column of the table is the highest capacity of
congested lines between France and Belgium.
We observe that reducing the access of either the (F-B) TSO or the (B-NL) TSO
to the common Belgian resources increases the re-dispatching cost, thereby causing
possibly important decreases of the corresponding social welfare compared to the results
of Model 3.1. (267,116,142,245 e). These amount to 5,5 and 202 million e for the
20Variation limits Total Average Welfare (PX)
for (F-B) TSO Re-dispatching costs Re-dispatching costs
898 454,592,586 0.377905 267,116,139,261
898*0.5 454,878,412 0.378143 267,115,853,435
898*0.1 656,384,167 0.545655 266,914,347,681
Table 4: Welfare, total and average re-dispatching costs of the scenarios where (F-B) has
limited action in Belgium
cases \936*0.1" and \898*0.1" respectively. This is explained as follows. Constraining
the recourse to counter-trading resources for one agent introduces a scarcity rent that
adds to the opportunity cost of this agent when it hits its quota. Because prices of
counter-trading resources are no longer the same, valuation of the interconnections at
opportunity cost is no longer the same and perfect coordination is lost (see Section
4.2.2).
6.4.4 Model 3.4 : Uncoordinated counter-trading with four national
TSOs
The situation deteriorates signicantly when the four TSOs of Model 3 operate inde-
pendently. In this last case, depicted in Figure 8, we suppose that counter-trading is
run by the purely national TSOs.
Figure 8: Four national TSOs
We nd that this model is infeasible: uncoordinated TSO cannot remove the line
overows created by the clearing of the energy market in market-coupling. The infea-
21sibility comes from the violation of the capacities of four interconnections (Germany
and The Netherlands, Belgium and The Netherlands, France and Belgium and France
and Belgium). Only an expansion of the network may restore feasibility. In particular,
signicant increases of the capacity of these lines remove overows. These additional
capacities amount to +40% for the Belgian-French inter-connectors and +200% for the
Belgian-Dutch inter-connector.
Notwithstanding these capacity increases, the results obtained with this modied
model still reveals a quite inecient solution. Not counting the cost of capacity addi-
tions the social welfare amounts to 264,181,743,898 e (1.1% lower than in Model 1).
This is equivalent to a welfare loss of 2.9 billion e/year; a gure that is considerably
higher than what was observed before. Moreover, the average re-dispatching cost in
The Netherlands is quite high (35.67 e/MWh). In Belgium, this average is lower (4.32
e/MWh), but still higher than the values encountered in the previous scenario. Note
that there are no re-dispatching costs in France and in Germany (see Table 5). Con-
gestion problems remain on interconnections and Belgium and The Netherlands where
national TSOs handle them at the above mentioned costs.
Re-dispatching costs (e/MWh)
G F B NL
0.00 0.00 4.32 35.67
Table 5: Average re-dispatching costs
The conclusion of an impossible removal of line overows by the four TSOs acting
independently may look unrealistic. Even if an illustrative case study cannot pretend
to realistic data and hence realistic results, most will argue that this outcome is too
excessive to be meaningful. We conclude by explaining that it is in fact quite plausible.
It should be recalled here that the capacities assumed in the PX model of market-
coupling are obtained by simply adding the capacities of the lines. This gives the PX
enormous trading possibilities, in fact higher than those that are eectively possible.
The results of Models 2 and 3 show that coordinated counter-trading allows one to
accommodate this trade, but at a cost. In contrast the absence of cooperation makes
counter-trading ineective. The interpretation of the result if immediate: TSOs oer
transmission capacities that are much lower than the real possibilities of the grid. The
22comparison of this with the other models illustrates how much one sacrices on energy
trading possibilities to allow TSOs to remain independent.
7 Conclusion
These formulations provide dierent insights into what TSO cooperation can bring
to the internal electricity market. The integration of the energy and transmission is
the paradigm of eciency. We also nd that MC with an integrated TSO (Model 2)
can be reasonably ecient if agents do not take advantage of that separation to game
the counter-trading market. Interestingly we also nd that multilateral arrangements
where dierent TSOs procure counter-trading resources on the same terms can partially
substitute full coordination. This result is attractive but still requires an internal
market of counter-trading resources. These should be available to all TSOs without
price discrimination or restriction of access. Any limitation of the recourse to these
resources, whether resulting from regulatory measures or just pure economics (e.g. the
French TSO not resorting to German resources because it is not economic to do so)
jeopardizes the coordination result, therefore leading to a more costly counter-trading.
The most striking results is the impact of uncoordinated counter-trading. Independent
TSOs can only manage the congestion resulting from MC with a drastic increase of
network capacities. In practice, this means that independent TSOs eectively manage
congestions by drastically restricting the possibilities of the grid compared to what
could be done with a more integrated solution.
One should note in closing that we adopted a very optimistic view on counter-
trading resources. We supposed that all resources available to the energy markets are
also available for counter-trading. This is unrealistic and should be adapted when
moving from an academic illustrative study to a real analysis.
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